Sapphirefoxx passwords verification#
Sapphirefoxx passwords password#

You'll also regularly see arguments stating that what many consider to be 2FA is really just 2-step.

Sapphirefoxx passwords password#

So, by copying both your memorized password and the OTP configuration, an attacker could successfully impersonate you without actually stealing anything physical. This is because the key to the authentication isn't the device itself, but rather information stored on the device which could in theory be copied by an attacker. While the phone may appear to be 'something you have', from a security perspective it's still 'something you know'. After providing the password you've memorized, you're required to also provide the one-time password displayed on your phone. Let me draw from an excellent Security Stack Exchange explanation of this: A good example of this is the two-step authentication required by Gmail. Entering 2 different passwords, for example, might be 2-step but is entirely predicated on 'something you know'. But, of course, MFA could also be 3FA and combine all the above factors, or even 4FA using an additional factor such as physical location.Р”Сћ-Step authentication does not necessarily require 2 discrete factors.

Sapphirefoxx passwords verification#

Same again with verification via SMS (don't lose your minds just yet, I'll come back to this). In consumer-facing implementations, most MFA is 2FA such as the RSA token example above. Strictly speaking, 2FA is MFA in that obviously, it's more than one factor. The bank card alone is useless as is the PIN it's only a combination of the 2 that is usable. Here's a very consumer-friendly way of describing 2FA: withdrawing money from an ATM requires two factors being your bank card (something you have) and your PIN (something you know). Requiring, for example, both a password and a fingerprint would be a 2FA implementation. When it comes to 'something you are', we're talking biometrics so think fingerprints, face, etc. For every good security solution, someone will always find a way of screwing it up: This was a pretty solid way of doing auth, albeit a bit clunky and still not foolproof. The bars on the left of the LCD screen would count down after which the digits would be rotated and I'd need to enter a different TOTP when authenticating. When I logged onto the work VPN, I needed to enter not just my Active Directory credentials but also the 6-digit number shown in the token above known as a time-based one-time password (TOTP). The former is a physical device, for example I had one of these old RSA tokens more than a decade ago back in corporate land: Adding a second factor typically means either requiring 'something that you have' or 'something that you are'. If someone obtains the thing that you know then it's (probably) game over and they have access to your account. For some quick perspective, a password alone is 1FA in that when you authenticate merely by entering a secret, all you require is one factor - 'something that you know'. They may all be familiar, but there are important differences that warrant explanation and we'll start with the acronym we most commonly see:Р”СћFA is two-factor authentication. Let's not get bogged down in that and instead focus on the practical implications of each. Before I do that, a caveat: every single time I see discussion on what these terms mean, it descends into arguments about the true meaning and mechanics of each. Let's start with defining some terms because they tend to be used a little interchangeably. Your email address is the skeleton key to your life (not just 'online' life) so protecting that is absolutely paramount. This post will be partly about 2FA in general, but also specifically about Google's program because of the masses of people dependent on them for Gmail. Per the title, not just any old 2FA but U2F and in particular, Google's Advanced Protection Program. This week, I wanted to focus on going beyond passwords and talk about 2FA. A few people took some of the points I made in those posts as being contentious, although on reflection I suspect it was more a case of lamenting that we shouldn't be in a position where we're still dependent on passwords and people needing to understand good password management practices in order for them to work properly. Last week I wrote a couple of different pieces on passwords, firstly about why we're going to be stuck with them for a long time yet and then secondly, about how we all bear some responsibility for making good password choices.